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Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973-1995
James S. Liebman,* Jeffrey Fagan,** Valerie West,***
and Jonathan Lloyd****
I. Introduction
Americans seem to be of two minds about the death penalty.' In the
last several years, the overall number of executions has risen steeply,
reaching a fifty year high this year.2 Although two-thirds of the public
support the penalty,3 this figure represents a sharp decline from the four-
* Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
** Professor of Public Health, Joseph L. Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University,
and Visiting Professor, Columbia Law School.
*** Doctoral candidate, Department of Sociology, New York University.
* J.D. candidate, Columbia Law School.
1. See, e.g., Paul Duggan, Rising Number of Executions Welcomed, Decried, WASH. POST, Dec.
13, 1999, at A3, available in 1999 WL 30308153; AbrahamMcLaughlin, 98 Executions in '99 Reignite
a Capital Debate, CHRISTIAN So. MONITOR, Dec. 27, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 5384560
(both generally discussing death penalty issues and the arguments for and against capital punishment).
2. See Linda Greenhouse, Death Penalty Gets Attention of High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
1999, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File ("[T]here [were] 82 executions in the first
10 months of [1999J, a pace unequaled since the early 1950's."). From 1984 to 1991, an average of
about 15 people were executed each year in the United States. The average rose to about 30 each year
between 1992 and 1994, to about 60 in the next four years, and to 98 (the most in a single year since
1951) in 1999. See Greenhouse supra; NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH ROW
U.S.A. REPORTER CURRENT SERVICE 1465 (Winter 2000). Notably, however, two states-Texas and
Virginia-account for almost half of the executions in the United States during the last 15 years. See
Statistics on the DP in the USA < http://agitator.com/dp/statisticslindex.html > (last modified Feb. 17,
2000) (reporting that of the 612 people executed in the United States since 1876, Texas and Virginia
are responsible for 281 of those executions); infra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the death
penalty in Virginia). Other states with large death row populations-California, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Mississippi, and Tennessee, for example-rarely execute more than one person in any year. See infra
note 43. Moreover, since 1976, the number executed annually in the United States has never exceeded
three percent of the nation's death row population, and stayed continuously within the one-half to two
percent range from 1984 to 1998. See infra Figure 3, notes 58-65 and accompanying text. The
likelihood that any given death row prisoner will be executed has been, and remains, low.
3. See Dalia Sussman, Split Decision on Death Penalty (Jan. 19, 2000) <http://abcnews.go.com
sectionslpolitics/dailynews/pollOO0119.html> (reporting that in an ABCNEWS.com poll, 64% of
Americans say they support the death penalty for people convicted of murder); Frank Newport, Support
for Death Penalty Drops to Lowest Level in 19 Years, Although Still High at 66%, GALLUP NEWS
SERVICE, (Feb. 24, 2000) <http:/lwww.gallup.comlpoll/ releases/pr000224.asp>. See also David
From, The Justice Americans Demand, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,2000, at A29, available in LEXIS, News
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fifths of the population that endorsed the death penalty only six years ago,
leaving support for capital punishment at a twenty year low.4 When life
without parole is offered as an alternative, support for the penalty drops
even more-often below a majority.' Grants of executive clemency
reached a twenty year high in 1999.6
Library, NYT File (questioning the democratic legitimacy of a moratorium on executions in light of
broad popular support for the penalty); Eugene H. Methvin, Death Penalty Is Fairer Than Ever, WALL
ST. J., May 10, 2000, at A26, available in 2000 WL-WSJ 3028765 (arguing that due to lengthy
appeals and DNA testing, death penalty convictions are more reliable than ever).
4. Compare Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans'
Views on the Death Penalty, J. SOC. ISSUES, Summer 1994, at 19, 20 fig. 1 (showing data indicating
increasing popular support for the death penalty from 1967 to 1994) with Mark Gillespie, Public
Opinion SupportsDeath Penalty, GALLUP NEWS SERV. (Feb. 24,1999) < http://www.gallup.com/poll/
releases/pr99024.asp> (noting that support for the death penalty has declined about 10% over the past
six years); Newport, supra note 3 (noting a 4% decline in public support for the death penalty in 2000);
Kathy Walt, Death Penalty's Support Plunges to a 30-year Low, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 15, 1998, at
Al, available in Westlaw, News File, IISTNCHR database (reporting that "Texans' support for the
death penalty has slipped to its lowest point in more than three decades"-declining by 18 %-a shift
that is consistent with national attitudes); and Editorial, A Moratorium on Killing, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Dec. 26, 1999, at B2, available in 1999 WL 3062342 ("Could this [rise in opposition to
the death penalty] be the start of a shift in public opinion... ?").
For statewide trends in public opinion, see Death Penalty Information Center, Recent Poll
Findings, (visited May 17, 2000), <http://www.essential.org/dpiclpo.html> [hereinafter DPIC]
(reporting that polls reveal declining support for the death penalty in Michigan, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Kentucky, Illinois, Minnesota, and Virginia); Death Penalty Support Declines, PR
NEWSWIRE, available in Westlaw, News File, ALLNEWSPLUS database, Mar. 6, 2000 (reporting that
public support in Illinois for the death penalty fell from 76% in August of 1994 to 63% in March of
1999, and 58% in 2000); Greg Lucas, Poll Takes Snapshot of Californians' Views, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
14, 2000, at A20, available in 2000 WL 6472849 ("In California, only 49 percent of those surveyed
favor the death penalty compared to 56 percent nationally .... ."); Support for Death Penalty Slips in
Minnesota, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Mar. 21, 2000, available in Westlaw, News File,
APWIRES database (reporting that the number of Minnesotans who favor the death penalty dropped
from 73% in 1996 to 57% in 2000); Walt, supra (reporting that support for the death penalty in Texas
fell by 18% from 1994 to 1998).
5. See Sussman, supra note 3 (discussing an ABCNEWS.com poll that found 64% of Americans
say they support the death penalty for murder convictions, but that the number drops to 48 % when life
without parole is a sentencing option). State-specific polls reveal similar trends. See Kathy Barrett
Carter, 63% of Jerseyans Favor Death Penalty-But Support Drops 9% Since '94 Polls Show, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark), Oct. 10, 1999, at 025 (reporting that in New Jersey, a 63% approval for capital
punishment drops to 44% when life without parole is a choice); DPIC, supra note 4 (visited Feb. 23,
2000) (noting that Missouri residents "overwhelmingly support" the death penalty); A Moratorium on
Killing, supra note 4 (noting that the number of Missouri residents who support the death penalty drops
to 46% when life without parole is available); Lucas, supra note 4, at A20 (reporting a recent
California poll that asked respondents to choose between death or life without parole as the appropriate
punishment for murder: 49% chose death and 47% chose life without parole); Eric Zorn, Prosecutors
Deaf to Outcry Against Death Penalty, CHIC. TRIB., Mar. 7, 2000, at 1, available in 2000 WL
3643214 (showing a 15-point drop in support for the death penalty-from 58% to 43%-when life
without parole is an option). Forty-two states (including most of the I 1 noncapital sentencing states)
offer life without parole as a sentencing option. See Editorial, Rising Doubts on Death Penalty, USA
TODAY, Dec. 22, 1999, at 17A, available in 1999 WL 6861984.
6. See Jim Yardley, Texas' Busy Death Chamber Helps Define Bush's Tenure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
7, 2000, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (presenting statistics on grants of
executive clemency post-Furman).
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In 1999 and 2000, governors, attorneys general and legislators in
Alabama, Arizona, Florida, and Tennessee fought high-profile campaigns
to increase the speed and number of executions.7 In the same period,
however:
" The Republican Governor of Illinois, with support from a majority of
the electorate, declared a moratorium on executions in that state.8
" The Nebraska Legislature attempted to enact a similar moratorium.
Although the Governor vetoed the legislation, the legislature
appropriated money for a comprehensive study of the even-handedness
of the state's exercise of capital punishment.9
" Similar studies have been ordered in Illinois by the Chief Justice, task
forces of both houses of the state legislature, and the governor. 10
7. See Alabama Looks to Speed Up Executions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 3, 2000; Yoji Cole,
Napolitano Wants to Find Ways to Speed Executions, ARIZ. REPUB., Feb. 16, 2000, at B7; Sara Rimer,
Florida Passes Bill to Quicken Execution Pace, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2000 available in LEXIS, News
Library, NYT File, at Al; John Shiffman, Tennessee May Limit Death Row Appeals, NASHVILLE
TENNESSEAN, Apr. 10, 2000 <http://www.tennessean.com>; Bobby Ross, Jr., Most Oklahomans
Favor Death Penalty-Poll Finds Most Want Shorter Appeals Process, THE OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 13,
2000 <http://www.oklahoman.com> ("Seventy five percent [of Oklahomans]... favor the death
penalty."). Among the states mentioned, only Florida actually adopted speed-up legislation, and it was
unanimously invalidated under the state constitution by the Florida Supreme Court. See David Cox,
Court Strikes Down GOP's Death Row Appeal Plan, StN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Apr. 15, 2000,
at IA ("In a major blow to Gov. Jeb Bush and state Republican leaders, the Florida Supreme Court
on Friday unanimously struck down the Legislature's overhaul of the appeals process for Death Row
inmates.").
8. See William Claiborne, Ill. Governor, Citing Errors, Will Block Executions, WASH. POST, Jan.
31, 2000, at Al, available in 2000 WL 2283005 (reporting that Governor George Ryan imposed a
moratorium on the death penalty in Illinois by indefinitely staying all proposed executions until an
inquiry has been conducted into why more death row inmates have been exonerated than executed since
capital punishment was reinstated in 1977); Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars
Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File ("Citing
a 'shameful record of convicting innocent people and putting them on death row,' Gov. George Ryan
of Illinois today halted all executions in the state, the first such moratorium in the nation."). See also
Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Gov. George Ryan Plans to Block the Execution of Any Death Row
Inmate, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2000, available in 2000 WL 3631638 (citing a March 1999 poll showing
that Illinois death row exonerations have prompted 54% of the state's voters to favor and only 37% to
oppose a moratorium, notwithstanding majority support for the death penalty in the abstract).
9. In 1999, Nebraska's unicameral legislature passed a death penalty moratorium bill co-sponsored
by Republican Senator Kermit Brashear and Democrat Senator Ernie Chambers. See Robynn Tysyer,
Execution Suspension Approved: Senators Hand Johanns Life-and-Death Decision, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, May 20, 1999, at 1, available in Westlaw, News File, ALLNEWS database. Governor Mike
Johanns vetoed the bill, see Robynn Tysyer, Moratorium Vetoed:Death Penalty Timeout is Poor Policy,
Johanns Says, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 27, 1999, at 1, available in Westaw, News file,
ALLNEWS database, but the legislature unanimously overrode the veto as to the part of the bill that
allocated $165,000 to study the issue. See Robynn Tysyer, Death Penalty Study OK'd, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, May 28, 1999, at 1, available in Westlaw, News File, ALLNEWS database.
10. See, e.g., Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, String of Exonerations Spurs Legislative, Judicial
Texas Law Review [Vol. 78:1839
Indiana, Maryland, and the Attorney General of the United States have
followed suit."
* Serious campaigns to abolish the death penalty are under way in New
Hampshire 2 and (with the support of the governor and a popular
former Republican senator) in Oregon.13
9 The Florida Supreme Court and Mississippi Legislature recently acted
to improve the quality of counsel in capital cases,' 4 and bills with
Panels to Study Reforms, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1999, at N8, available in 1999 WL 2932558 (noting
that the Illinois General Assembly and Illinois Supreme Court have created four committees to study
the death penalty); Bob Chiarito, House Panel Set to Consider Moratorium on Executions, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Jan. 26, 2000, at 3, available in Weslaw, News Library, ALLNEWS File (discussing a
proposed bill that would create an eight-member commission to study the law governing the death
penalty and its administration); Ryan Keith, Task Force on Capital Cases Calls for Videotaping of
Suspects, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 2000, at M6, available in 2000 WL 3646355 (summarizing proposed
legislation that would give defendants in capital cases more legal rights); Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong,
Prosecutors Under Glare at Reform Hearing, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28, 2000, at N20, available in 2000 WL
3631173 (noting that during hearings on the reform of the Illinois death penalty system, it was
suggested that an independent commission be formed to investigate wrongful convictions); Evan Osnos
& David Heinzmann, Death Penalty Remains an Option, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2000, available in 2000
WL 3631835 (stating that Governor Ryan "intends to postpone any executions by granting reprieves
to Death Row inmates until a special panel can be created"); Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong,
Revamp Urged in Handling of Capital Cases, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 1999, at Nl, available in 1999 WL
2928957 [hereinafter Possley & Armstrong, Revamp Urged] (describing efforts for the creation of a
special capital litigation trial bar).
11. See Moratorium Now! (visited May 16, 2000) <http: //www.quixote.org/ej>; see also
Benjamin Wallace-Wells, States Follow Illinois Lead on Death Penalty, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9,2000,
at A3, available in 2000 WL 3311890 (discussing reactions in various states to Governor Ryan's
moratorium on the death penalty).
12. See John DiStaso & John Toole, Death Penalty Fate Still Up in Air in Senate, UNION LEADER
(Manchester), Mar. 13, 2000, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Union Leader File (reporting
that on March 9, 2000, New Hampshire's majority-Republican House of Representatives voted to
abolish the death penalty); Gene Johnson, N.H. Votes to Repeal Death Penalty, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 19, 2000, available in 2000 WL 20910239 (reporting the New Hampshire Senate vote to repeal
the death penalty); Robert Anthony Phillips, N.H. Considers Abolishing UnusedDeath Penalty, (visited
Mar. 10, 2000) <http://www.apbnews.com>.
13. See Brad Cain, Two Oregon Ttans Want Death Penalty Ended, THE COLUMBIAN (Apr. 7,
2000) at B5, available in 2000 WL 4478664 ("[Governor John] Kitzhaber and [former Senator Mark]
Hatfield-two of Oregon's most popular political figures-have lent their names to an effort to ask
voters to outlaw capital punishment in November.").
14. See Jack Elliott Jr., Death Row-Defense Bills Move Through Legislature, BILowI SUN HERALD,
Mar. 2, 2000, at AS, available in Westlaw, News Library, BILSUNH File (discussing proposals in the
Mississippi Legislature to make state money available to smaller Mississippi counties to alleviate the
expense of competent trial and state post-conviction representation in capital cases); Carol Marbin
Miller, State High Court Raises Standards for Lawyers in Death Row Cases, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV.,
Nov. 5, 1999, at B1 (discussing the Florida Supreme Court's adoption of rules setting minimum
standards for defense attorneys in capital cases that require lead capital defense attorneys to have at
least five years trial experience in criminal cases-including at least nine jury trials in serious or
complex matters and at least two capital cases-and encourage trial judges to appoint two defense
lawyers in each case). See also Possley & Armstrong, Revamp Urged, supra note 10 (reporting that
at least a dozen states "have established minimum standards for defense attorneys in capital cases,"
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bipartisan sponsorship aiming to do the same and to improve capital
prisoners' access to DNA evidence have been introduced in both
houses of the United States Congress. 15
Observers in the Wll Street Journal, New York limes Magazine, Salon,
and on ABC This Wek see "a tectonic shift in the politics of the death
penalty." 6
In April 2000 alone, George Will 7 and Reverend Pat Robertson-
both strong death penalty supporters-expressed doubts about the manner
which typically "require that at least two attorneys be appointed in capital cases and that they have a
certain number of years of experience in trying criminal matters").
15. See, e.g., Mike Doming, Death Penalty Reforms Gain Backers in D. C., CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31,
2000, at N 1, available in 2000 WL 3651265 (describing bipartisan support and sponsorship for a House
bill-paralleling one proposed in the Senate by Sen. Patrick Leahy-aimed at improving capital
defendants' access to DNA evidence and adequate representation, and providing for other protective
procedures); Mike Doming, Senator to Propose Death Row Safeguards, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2000,
at NI, available in 2000 WL 3635167 (summarizing federal legislation proposed by Vermont Senator
Patrick Leahy that would, inter alia, give states incentives to "require that indigent death penalty
defendants be allowed a team of at least two court-appointed attorneys" who "meet competency
standards set by the U.S. Administrative Office of the Courts").
16. ABC This Week (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 9, 2000) <http://abcnews.go.comlonairl
thisweek/ThisWeekIndex.html > (roundtable discussion based on George Will's column, cited infra note
17, and Reverend Pat Robertson's expression of support for a death penalty moratorium, in which all
four panelists agreed with Robertson, prompting Stephanopoulos to discern "really a tectonic shift in
the politics of the death penalty"). See also John Harwood, Bush May Be Hurt by Handling of Death-
Penalty Issue, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2000, at A28, available in 2000 WL-WSJ 3022420 (noting the
"remarkable... absence of public protest" when Governor Ryan declared the Illinois moratorium on
executions and discerning "a national shift in the politics of capital punishment"); Michael Kroll,
Executioner's Swan Song? (Feb. 8, 2000) <http:llwww.salon.comnewslfeature/2000/02/08/death
penalty/index.html > (asserting that Governor Ryan's decision to suspend the death penalty represents
a "public shift"); Bruce Shapiro, Capital Offense, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 26, 2000 ("But suddenly
... death-row innocence cases have taken hold of the public mind, and capital punishment itself seems
to be approaching a political tipping point."). See also Steven A. Holmes, Look Who's Questioning
the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, § 4, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT
File (noting that the "conservative rethinking" of the death penalty is exemplified by Governor Ryan's
imposed moratorium on the death penalty in his state); Johnson, supra note 8 (reporting that the issue
of wrongful executions "is gaining resonance around the nation, after many years in which it was seen
as essentially a dead letter in American politics"); Lucas, supra note 4 (stating that recent public
opinion polls suggest that politicians need not be so rigid in their stance and their perception of the
public's opinion on the use of the death penalty); Clarence Page, Close Calls on Death Row Finally
Prompting Second Thoughts, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 16, 2000, available in 2000 WL 7572819
(discussing Governor Ryan's actions in the context of national movements related to the death penalty).
17. In an opinion column discussing a recently published book by Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld,
and Jim Dwyer entitled Actual Innocence, George Will concluded:
You could fill a book with such hair-curing true stories of blighted lives and justice
traduced [as a result of the capital conviction of innocent defendants]. Three authors have
filled one. It should change the argument about capital punishment and other aspects of
the criminal justice system. Conservatives, especially, should draw this lesson from the
book: Capital punishment, like the rest of the criminal justice system, is a government
program, so skepticism is in order.
George F. Will, Innocent On Death Row, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2000, at A23, available in 2000 WL
2295245.
Texas Law Review
in which government officials carry out the penalty in the United States,
and Robertson subsequently advocated a moratorium on Meet the Press.'"
In response, Reverend Jerry Falwell called for continued-even swifter-
execution of death sentences.19
Fueling these competing initiatives are two beliefs about the death
penalty: One is that death sentences move too slowly from imposition to
execution, undermining deterrence and retribution, subjecting our criminal
laws and courts to ridicule, and increasing the agony of victims.?0 The
other is that death sentences are fraught with error, causing justice too
often to miscarry, and subjecting innocent and other undeserving
defendants-mainly, racial minorities and the poor-to execution."z
Some observers attribute these seemingly conflicting events and
opinions to "America's own schizophrenia .... We believe in the death
penalty, but shrink from it as' applied." '  These views may not conflict,
however, and Americans who hold both may not be irrational. It may be
that capital sentences spend too much time under review and that they are
fraught with disturbing amounts of error. Indeed, it may be that capital
sentences spend so much time under judicial review precisely because they
are persistently and systematically fraught with alarming amounts of error,
and that the expanding production of death sentences may compound the
production of error. We are led to this conclusion by a study of all 4,578
capital sentences that were finally reviewed by state direct appeal courts
and all 599 capital sentences that were finally reviewed by federal habeas
corpus courts between 1973 and 1995.1
18. See Brooke A. Masters, Pat Robertson Urges Moratorium On U.S. Executions, WASH. POSr,
Apr. 8,2000, at Al, available in 2000 WL2295691 (quoting Robertson's statement that "a moratorium
would be very appropriate); Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, May 7, 2000) (interviewing
Rev. Pat Robertson, who explains his simultaneous support for the death penalty and a moratorium on
executions); Robertson Backs Moratorium, Says Death Penalty Used Unfairly, CHi. TRiB., Apr. 8,
2000, at N12, available in 2000 WL 3654070 (summarizing Robertson's views on the death penalty
expressed during a symposium at the William and Mary Law School).
19. See Frank Green, Falwell Opposes a Moratorium, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 11,
2000, at B4, available in 2000 WL 5035053 ("'Well, Pat and I do not disagree on many things, but
on this one we do .... I don't think a moratorium is needed.").
20. See the views expressed by Falwell, From and Methvin, supra notes 3, 19 and accompanying
text.
21. See the views expressed by Robertson, Will and others, supra notes 17-18 and accompanying
text.
22. Kroll, supra note 16.
23. Much of the information reported here is contained in six electronically stored databases. The
authors generated the first two of these databases in their entirety; the other four were generated by
others.
The first database-referred to herein as "DADB" (for Direct Appeal Database)-contains
information on all 4,578 state capital direct appeals that were finally decided between 1973 and 1995.
To be "finally decided" within that time period, the highest state court with jurisdiction to review
capital judgments in the relevant state must have taken one of two actions during the study period: (1)
affirmed the capital judgment, or (2) overturned the capital judgment (conviction or sentence) on one
or more grounds. (Capital judgments are overturned on direct appeal only on the basis of "serious
1844 [Vol. 78:1839
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error," as defined infra note 29 and accompanying text.) If one of those two actions occurred prior
to or during 1995 and the United States Supreme Court thereafter denied certiorari review, the case is
nonetheless included in the study because the Supreme Court's action did not affect the finality of the
state decision. If the Supreme Court instead granted certiorari in a case but did not decide the case
before or during 1995, the case is omitted from the study because the Supreme Court's action withdrew
the finality of the decision. DADB contains the name of the individual whose capital judgment was
under review; the sentencing state; the year, outcome, citation, and subsequent judicial history
(rehearing, certiorari) of the decision finally resolving the appeal; and information about the basis for
reversal if a reversal occurred.
The second database-referred to herein as "HCDB" (for Habeas Corpus Database)-contains
information on all 599 initial (i.e., nonsuccessive) capital federal habeas corpus cases that were finally
decided between 1973 and 1995. To be "finally decided" within that time period, all of the following
events must have occurred in the case within the study period: (1) a United States District Court must
have (a) denied habeas corpus relief, thereby approving the capital judgment, or (b) granted habeas
corpus relief from the capital judgment (conviction or sentence) on one or more grounds; (2) if an
appeal was timely filed, a United States Court of Appeals must have taken or approved action (1)(a)
or (1)(b); and (3) if certiorari review was timely filed, the United States Supreme Court must have
either (a) denied review or (b) granted review and taken or approved action (1)(a) or (1)(b). (Federal
habeas relief from capital judgments is granted only on the basis of "serious error," as defined infra
note 29 and accompanying text.) HCDB contains the name of the individual whose capital judgment
was under review; the sentencing state; the timing of the habeas petition and its adjudication at the
various stages; the outcome at the various stages; information about the petitioner, lawyers, judges,
courts, victim, and offense; the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found at trial; procedures used
during the habeas review process; and the asserted and the judicially accepted bases for and defenses
to habeas relief.
The first database that was generated by others-referred to herein as "DRCen" (for Death Row
U.S.A. Census)-is a compilation of the information used to produce the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's
quarterly death row census Death Row U.S.A. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND,
DEATH Row U.S.A. REPORTER CURRENT SERVICE [hereinafter DEATH Row U.S.A.]. This database
has the name of all individuals who were on a state death row between 1973 and 1995, the state where
their death sentence was imposed, and the sentencing year. Death Row U.S.A. is also our source of
information about when and where executions occurred and whether they were consensual or
nonconsensual, as defined infra note 27.
Three additional databases used in this Article contain information collected by the United States
Government. The database referred to herein as "USCen" (for U.S. Census) is a compilation of
information collected by the United States Census Bureau. See U.S. Census Bureau, American
Facofnder, (visited May 20, 2000) <http://factfimder.census.gov/java_prod/dads.ui.homePage.
HomePage > (providing a searchable database of census information). "UCRDB" (for Uniform Crime
Reports Database) is a compilation of information collected by the United States Department of Justice's
Bureau of Justice Statistics in its annual Uniform Crime Reports. See National Archive of Criminal
Justice Data (NACJD), Uniform Crime Reporting Data, (visited May 20, 2000)
<http:llwww.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJDucr.htmnl#ucr> (providing access to the UCR database); see
also Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform CrimeReports, (visited May 20, 2000) < http://www.fbi.
gov/ucr.htm> (providing abstracts and summaries of data). "PrisCen" (for Prison Census) is a
compilation of information collected annually by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. See U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS (various years).
A final data set relied upon here is reported in full in James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, and
Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases 1973-1995 <www.thejusticeproject.
org > [hereinafter A Broken System], and contains an incomplete list of the capital cases in which state
post-conviction relief was granted between 1973 and the present. The list is incomplete because many
state post-conviction decisions (whether or not relief was granted) are not reported, and information
on them is not available except by a search of the records of each of the thousands of local,
intermediate, and statewide courts in the United States with jurisdiction over capital post-conviction
cases. The list is also incomplete in that it only reports state post-conviction reversals. It thus does
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II. Summary of Central Findings
In Furman v. Georgiae4 in 1972, the Supreme Court reversed all
existing capital statutes and death sentences.' The modem death-
sentencing era began the next year with the implementation of new capital
statutes designed to satisfy Furman. In order to collect information about
capital sentences imposed and reviewed after 1973 (no central repository
exists), we conducted a painstaking search, beginning in 1995, of all
published state and federal judicial opinions in the United States conducting
direct and habeas review of capital judgments, and many of the available
opinions conducting state post-conviction review of those judgments. We
then (1) checked and catalogued all cases the opinions revealed, (2)
collected hundreds of items of information about each case from the
published decisions and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's quarterly death
row census,26  (3) tabulated the results, and (4) (still in progress)
conducted multivariate statistical analyses to identify factors that may
contribute to those results.
Six years in the making, our central findings thus far are these:
* Between 1973 and 1995, approximately 5,760 death sentences were
imposed in the United States. Only 313 (5.4%; one in 19) of those
resulted in an execution during the period.'
not contain the information needed to produce an accurate count of (1) the number and percentage of
capital judgments that "cleared" state direct review and were finally decided by state post-conviction
courts during the study period (a large but unknown number of cases that "cleared" direct appeal during
the study period were pending in front of, but had not yet been finally decided by, state post-conviction
courts as of the end of 1995), and (2) the number and percentage of capital judgments that were finally
reviewed on state post-conviction that were either affirmed or overturned. The. data in this final data
set were collected during April, 2000 in the following manner: Capital attorneys in each of the 28 states
on which this study focuses (states in which at least one capital judgment was reviewed on federal
habeas corpus between 1973 and 1995) were contacted and asked to report and provide any available
information about all known cases in which capital judgments were overturned during state post-
conviction proceedings since 1973. The names of individuals granted capital state post-conviction relief
and some additional identifying information was received from 26 of the 28 states (all but Delaware
and Washington). In all cases, the reporting attorney said that he or she was not sure that the list of
reversals provided was complete. Where possible through the use of cases reported in the national
reporter system or on Westlaw, the information provided was verified and supplemented. Also verified
were all unpublished cases from Nevada (as to which the actual unpublished opinions were provided);
most unpublished cases from Arizona and Texas (using newspaper accounts available on Westlaw and
cited in A Broken System), and a few additional unpublished cases where the secondary sources cited
in A Broken System were readily at hand, such as the John Henry Knapp case in Arizona. See Anthony
Sommer, Knapp Sentenced to Time Served, Goes Free after Pleading No Contest, PHOENIX GAZErrE,
Nov. 20, 1992, at B1, available in 1992 WL 8297955. Other unreported information has not been
verified, although information has been provided that permits verification using local court records-a
task for future research.
24. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
25. See id. at 239-40.
26. DEATH ROW U.S.A., supra note 23.
27. DRCen, supra note 23; DEATH Row U.S.A., supra note 23, at 907. The figure in the text
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* Of the 5,760 death sentences imposed in the study period, 4,578
(79%) were finally reviewed on "direct appeal" by a state high
court.' Of those, 1,885 (41%) were thrown out on the basis of
"serious error" (error that substantially undermines the reliability of
the outcome).29
refers to all executions during the study period. For the reasons discussed below, see infra note 29,
when calculating error rates it often is sensible to consider only the executions that were nonconsensual
in the sense that the prisoner insisted that his capital judgment be subjected to the full review process
before he was executed. The number of nonconsensual executions between 1973 and 1995 was 263,
or 4.6% of the total number of death sentences. See DEATH ROW U.S.A., supra note 23, at 8-23;
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPIrrAL PUNISHMENT 1998 12 (1999) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/cp98.pdf >.
28. DRCen, supra note 23; DADB, supra note 23. The state direct appellate process is described
infra note 29.
29. DADB, supra note 23. In calculating error rates, we count only errors that result in the
reversal of a capital conviction or sentence. To do so, the error must be "serious" in three respects.
First, to be reversible, error must be prejudicial, either because the defendant shows it potentially
affected the outcome of her case or because it is the kind of error that almost always has that effect.
See 2 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§
32.1, 32.3, 32.4 (3rd ed. 1998) (discussing the harmless error doctrine). The vast majority of error
that state appellate courts discover is deemed harmless and does not result in reversal. In Illinois, for
example, in addition to reversing half of the capital judgments it has reviewed, "the Illinois Supreme
Court has upheld scores of death sentences while forgiving trial errors that benefited prosecutors,
dismissing the errors as harmless." Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death Row Justice Derailed, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 2932178. One such case was Anthony Porter's, in
which the Illinois Supreme Court based its harmlessness findings on the "'overwhelming'" evidence
of Porter's guilt; Porter was later released as innocent when another man confessed to his crime. Id.
Another article notes:
Between 1993 and 1997, there were 167 published opinions in which the Illinois Appellate
Court or Illinois Supreme Court found that prosecutors committed some form of
misconduct that could be considered harmless. In 122 of those cases-or nearly three out
of four times-the reviewing court affirmed the conviction, holding that the misconduct
was "ham-Jess."
Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at
1, available in 1999 WL 2834609. And in Oklahoma, "[a]t least four men convicted of murder have
received new trials based upon an appellate finding that [Oklahoma City's District Attorney] broke the
rules of a fair trial"; that same office has been criticized by courts for similar misconduct in "at least
17 other" cases in which the errors were found harmless. Ken Armstrong, 'Cowboy Bob' Ropes
Wins-Butat Considerable Cost, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at N13, available in 1999 WL 2833491.
Second, to be reversible, error generally must have been properly preserved. Most state direct
appeal courts will not grant relief based on error-no matter how egregious and prejudicial-that the
defendant did not properly preserve by way of (1) a timely objection at trial, (2) reiteration in a timely
new trial motion at the end of trial, and (3) timely and proper assertion on appeal. See 1 LIEBMAN &
HERTZ, supra, §§ 7.1a, at 276-77 & n,29 (discussing the need to fully litigate all federal law claims
in the state court). This is true even in cases where the failure to preserve the error was the fault of
counsel, not the defendant, and even in many cases where the counsel's mistake resulted from
inexperience, incompetence, or sheer stupidity, and not a valid exercise of professional judgment. See
Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due
to Inadequate Representation ofIndigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 679, 683 (1990) (discussing
the low "effective assistance of counsel" standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984));
Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding Implementation of the American BarAssociation's
Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and Calling for a Moratorium on
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0 Most of the remainder of the death sentences were then inspected by
state post-conviction courts. Although incomplete, our data
(reported in A Broken System3 t) reveal that state post-conviction
review is an important source of review in some states, including
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, and North Carol-
ina.3 In Maryland, for example, at least 52% of capital judgments
reviewed in state post-conviction proceedings during the study period
were overturned due to serious error; the same was true for at least
25 % of the capital judgments that were similarly reviewed in Indiana,
and at least 20% of those reviewed in Mississippi.
Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 28-30 (1996) (examining the ABA Task Force
discussion of procedural requirements). Numerous prisoners have been executed despite acknowledged
prejudicial errors affecting their convictions and sentences because they failed to preserve their
objections. Examples include the capital prisoners in Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-70
(1996); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747-49 (1991); Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 408
(1989); and Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533-35 (1986), each of whom had an evidently meritorious
constitutional claim that he was capitally convicted or sentenced in violation of the United States
Constitution, but nonetheless was denied relief in state (and then, as a consequence, federal) court based
on his failure to assert the claim at the time or in the manner required by state law, and was
subsequently executed. See DEATH ROW U.S.A., supra note 23, at ix, xi, xvi.
Finally and most obviously, even prejudicial error only results in reversal if it is
discovered. If it is not discovered because, for example, the party responsible for it fails to disclose
it, see infra note 74 and accompanying text, reversal will not occur and the error will not be deemed
"serious" by our measure.
Hundreds of examples of "serious error" found in state post-conviction proceedings, and dozens
of examples of the even narrower category of "serious error" warranting federal habeas relief are
reported in the appendices to A Broken System, supra note 23.
30. For a discussion of errors found at the state post-conviction stage, see A Broken System, supra
note 23, app.; see also supra note 23.
31. See supra note 23.
32. See A Broken System, supra note 23.
33. See A Broken System, supra note 23, app. A (giving Maryland, Indiana and Mississippi Report
Cards). We can only say "at least" for the reasons set out infra note 36. The category of "serious
error" that leads to state post-conviction reversal is narrower than "serious error" at the direct appeal
stage, because generally only properly preserved state and federal constitutional violations that (1) were
not, and (2) could not have been raised on direct appeal can be the basis for state post-conviction
reversal. See supra note 29, infra note 35. The United States Supreme Court itself occasionally grants
relief in capital cases on review of state direct review proceedings. See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S.
391, 411 (1991) (reversing the state supreme court's finding that the incorrect jury instructions were
harmless error); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 585-90 (1988) (finding that a defendant's prior
conviction which had been overturned should not have been used as an aggravating factor, and that such
error was harmless); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (holding that in a felony murder case,
courts must find "major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless disregard for
human life," and remanding so the Arizona courts could make the latter determination); Trnesdale v.
Aiken, 480 U.S. 527 (1987) (reversing per curiam the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court
refusing to apply Skipperv. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) retroactively). We treat these Supreme
Court cases reviewing state post-conviction decisions as findings of "serious" error and, in all these
cases, federal constitutional error infecting capital sentences.
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* Of the death sentences that survived state direct and post-conviction
review, 599 were finally reviewed on a first habeas corpus petition
during the 23-year study period.' 4 Of those 599, 237 (40%) were
overturned due to serious error.35
The "overall success rate" of capital judgments undergoing judicial
inspection, and its converse, the "overall error-rate," are crucial
factors in assessing the efficiency of our capital punishment system.
The "overall success rate" is the proportion of capital judgments that
underwent, and passed, the three-stage judicial inspection process
during the study period. The "overall error rate" is the frequency
with which capital judgments that underwent full inspection were
overturned at one of the three stages due to serious error.36
34. See HCDB, supra note 23. "Final review" is defined supra note 23.
35. See HCDB, supra note 23. The definition of "serious error" that warrants reversal on habeas
is even narrower than the analogous definition at the direct appeal stage. Cf supra note 29 and
accompanying text (setting out the definition of serious error at the direct appeal stage). This is
because error is only reversible on habeas if it meets the three criteria for "seriousness" required on
direct appeal-it must be (1) prejudicial, (2) properly preserved and (3) discovered, see LIEBMAN &
HERTZ, supra note 29, §§ 7.1a, 11.2b, 26.1, 32.1-32.5; supra note 29 (explaining each
requirement-and if, in addition, the error (4) violates the federal Constitution, see 28 U.S.C. §§
2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (1994 and Supp. IV 1998) (providing that a federal judge may grant a writ of
habeas corpus if the prisoner is in custody in violation of the Constitution); (5) is not a search and
seizure claim, or some other claim based on the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, see Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (holding that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas
corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was
introduced at his trial"); (6) in habeas cases litigated in 1989 and after, is not based on "new law," see
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989) (declining to address the defendant's contention that Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), applies to petit juries because "the rule urged by petitioner should
not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review"); and (7) in habeas cases litigated in 1993
and after, meets a substantially higher standard of prejudice or "harmful error," see Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (determining that the standard for harmful error is error that
"had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict" (quoting Kotteakos
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946))). See generally LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 29, §§
9.1, 9.2, 25.1, 32.1 (discussing constraints (4) through (7) on habeas relief). Dozens of examples of
.serious error" warranting federal habeas relief from capital judgments imposed by most of the study
states are collected in A Broken System, supra note 23, app. D.
36. A production-line/product-inspection analogy helps explain how these figures are calculated.
The "overall error rate" is the proportion of capital judgments thrown out during the first (state direct
appeal) inspection due to serious error, plus the proportion of the judgments that survive the first
inspection thrown out at the second (state post-conviction) inspection, plus the proportion of judgments
that survive both state inspections thrown out at the final (federal habeas) stage. The "overall success
rate" is the converse. In note 37 infra, we use this method to calculate the national composite "overall
error rate."
As we indicate by our occasional use of the phrase "at least" in our narrative, and by our use
of the " " symbol in the national, state, and circuit Report Cards, see A Broken System, supra note
23, apps. A & B, the "overall error rates" calculated here are in fact underestimates. Due to
incomplete data we assume that all death sentences that survived the direct appeal inspection and are
not known to have been reversed during the state post-conviction inspection passed muster during that
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Nationally, over the entire 1973-1995 period, the overall error-rate in
our capital punishment system was 68%.37
* Because "serious error" is error that substantially undermines the
reliability of the guilt finding or death sentence imposed at trial,38
each instance of that error warrants public concern. The most com-
mon errors found at the state post-conviction stage (where our data are
most complete) are (1) egregiously incompetent defense lawyering
(accounting for 37% of the state post-conviction reversals), and (2)
prosecutorial suppression of evidence that the defendant is innocent or
does not deserve the death penalty (accounting for another 16%-or
19%, when all forms of law enforcement misconduct are consid-
ered). 39  These two violations count as "serious," and thus warrant
reversal, only when there is a "reasonable probability" that, but for
the responsible lawyer's miscues, the outcome of the trial would have
been different.'
The result of very high rates of serious, reversible error among capital
convictions and sentences, and very low rates of capital reconviction
and resentencing, is the severe attrition of capital judgments. Figure
1 illustrates the sources of attrition, and the eventual disposition of
cases where death sentences were reversed.
inspection. In fact, many capital judgments affirmed on direct appeal were pending in, but had not yet
beenfinally decided by, state post-conviction proceedings by the end of the study period. Inflating the
denominator in this way-using the class of cases available for review as a proxy for the cases that
actually underwent final review-leads us systematically to overestimate the success rate and
underestimate the error rate. See A Broken System, supra note 23; infra note 49.
37. See DADB, supra note 23; HCDB, supra note 23, A Broken System, supra note 23. Because
41% of the capital judgments reviewed on state direct appeal were found to be tainted by serious error,
only 59% of those judgments were available for state post-conviction review. Because at least 10% (this
figure is probably higher, see supra note 36) of that 59%-meaning at least 5.9% of the original pool
(->. 10 x .59 = ->.059)-failed this second, state post-conviction inspection, the overall rate of error
found by state courts is 47% (41% + 6%) of the original pool. Then, of the 53% (100%-47% =
53 %) of capital judgments that were available for federal habeas review, 40%-meaning 21% of the
original pool (.40 x .53)-failed the federal inspection. The "overall error rate" thus is at least 68%
of the overall pool (41% + >6%+ 21% = ; 68%). In other words, at least 68% of the capital
judgments that were fully inspected were found seriously flawed at some stage.
Our "overall error rate" is not the rate of error in the 5,760 death sentences imposed between
1973 and 1995. That number cannot be calculated because, at the end of 1995, many of those death
sentences were pending in some court awaiting review, but had not yet been finally resolved at one of
the three inspection stages. This rate instead uses the outcomes of the 4,578 cases in which state direct
review occurred during the study period, and the 599 of those cases in which subsequent federal habeas
review occurred, together with the 248 known state post-conviction reversals (taken as a proportion of
the 2,693 capital judgments that "cleared" state direct appeal) to calculate the error rate found in capital
judgments that were finally reviewed.
38. See supra note 29.
39. See A Broken System, supra note 23.
40. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1496 (2000); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263, 264 (1999).
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For every 100 death sentences imposed and reviewed during the study
period, 41 were turned back at the state direct appeal phase because
of serious error. Of the 59 that got through that phase to the second,
state post-conviction stage, at least4 10%-six more of the original
100-were turned back due to serious flaws. And, of the 53 that got
through that stage to the third, federal .habeas checkpoint, 40%-an
additional 21 of the original 100-were turned back because of serious
error. Overall, at least 68 of the original 100 were thrown out
because of serious flaws, compared to only 32 (or less) that were
found to have passed muster-after an average of 9-10 years had
passed.
And for each such 68 individuals whose death sentences were
overturned for serious error, 82% (56) were found on retrial not to
have deserved the death peialty, including 7% (5) who were cleared
of the capital offense.
0 The seriousness of these errors is also revealed by what happens on
retrial when the errors are supposed to be cured. In our state post-
conviction sub-study where the post-reversal outcome is known, over
four-fifths (56 out of 68) of the capital judgments that were reversed
were replaced on retrial with a sentence less than death, or no sen-
tence at all. In the latter regard, fully 7% of the reversals for serious
error resulted in a determination on retrial that the defendant was not
guilty of the offense for which he previously was sentenced to die.4'
41. For an explanation of why we say "at least," see supra note 36.
42. See A Broken System, supra note 23. If a capital conviction is overturned on appeal or post-
conviction review, the defendant may be (1) released for lack of evidence of guilt (as, for example, in
the Bowen, Brown, Jent, Miller, Nelson and Williamson cases summarized in A Broken System, supra
note 23); (2) permitted to accept a plea to a lesser offense, see, e.g., Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463
(9th Cir. 1997) (en bane), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1133 (1998); Miller and Jent v. Wainwright, Nos.
86-98-Vic.-T-13 and 85-1910-Civ.-T-13 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 1987)) orto the same offense but a lesser
penalty, see, e.g., Cervi v. Kemp, 855 F.2d 702 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033
(1989); Ross v. Kemp, 393 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. 1990)); (3) retried and (a) acquitted (as in the Wallace and
Munson/Oklahoma cases summarized in A Broken System, supra note 23), (b) released upon the jury's
failure to agree on a verdict (as in the Kyles case summarized in A Broken System, supra note 23), (c)
reconvicted of a noncapital offense, see, e.g., People v. Salazar, 643 N.E.2d 698 (1. 1994); State v.
Butler, 951 S.W.2d 600 (Mo. 1997)), (d) reconvicted of a capital offense but awarded a lesser
sentence, or (e) reconvicted and resentenced to die. If only the death sentence was overturned, the
defendant may be (1) offered, and accept, a plea or other arrangement resulting in a lesser sentence;
or (2) subjected to a new sentencing bearing at which the outcome is (a) a lesser sentence or (b) a death
sentence. Several of these potential results are illustrated by the outcomes in recent North Carolina
cases:
Last May, a Superior Court judge overturned the murder conviction and death
sentence of Charles Munsey ... because it was clear that he was innocent of murder, and
that the district attorney who prosecuted him ... as well as other law officials withheld
exculpatory evidence. Tragically, Munsey died... awaiting a new trial.
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0 High error rates pervade American capital-sentencing jurisdictions,
and are geographically dispersed. Among the twenty-six death-
sentencing jurisdictions in which at least one case has been reviewed
in both the state and federal courts and in which information about all
three judicial inspection stages is available:
1. 24 (92%) have overall error rates of 52% or higher;
2. 22 (85%) have overall errors rates of 60% or higher;
3. 15 (61%) have overall error rates of 70% or higher.
4. Among other states, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Indiana,
Oklahoma, Wyoming, Montana, Arizona, and California have
overall error rates of 75 % or higher.43
Last summer, a Guilford County prosecutor told a hearing judge that he "just plain
forgot" about a credible independent witness who could have provided a solid alibi for [death
row inmate] Stephen Mark Bishop. Bishop is awaiting a second trial.
In November, Alfred Rivera had been on North Carolina's death row for two years for
a double murder ... when, in a second trial, a jury acquitted him. The N.C. Supreme Court
had ordered the new trial, ruling that the trial judge should have allowed jurors to hear testimony
that Rivera had been framed by his co-defendants.
[Governor] Hunt commuted the death sentence of Wendell Flowers... in December over
doubts about his guilt ....
Stephen Dear, A Death Penalty Cease-Fire for N.C., NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Apr. 16, 2000,
at A31, available in 2000 WL 3924050
43. See DADB, supra note 23; HCDB, supra note 23; A Broken System, supra note 23. See also
infra Figures 2 and 3. For some time, the regional press has suspected the patterns that our study
demonstrates. For instance, in Illinois it was reported:
An Illinois Supreme Court ruling on Friday pushed the number of death-penalty cases in
Illinois that have been reversed for a new trial or sentencing hearing to 130-exactly half
the total of those capital cases that have completed at least one round of [state] appeals,
according to a Tribune analysis.
Ken Armstrong & Christi Parsons, Half of State's Death-Penalty Cases Reversed: A Variety of Errors
Found in 130 Trials, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 2000, at 1, available in 2000 WL 3629108. In the state of
Washington, seven state capital sentences were overturned in eight years. Mike Carter, Court Orders
Retrial in 1986 Murder Case, SEATrLE TIMES, July 15, 1999, at B 1, available in 1999 WL 6282738.
There were a total of only fourteen men on Washington's death row at that time. See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 27, at 6 <http:llwww.ojp.usdoj.govlbjslpublpdflcp98.pdf>. The
press has also shown suspicion in Utah, California, Florida, Nevada, and Tennessee. See Lee
Davidson, Death Row the End?: Most Get OutAlive, DESEREr NEWS (Salt Lake City), Dec. 13, 1999,
at BI, available in 1999 WL 26543645 (noting that since Utah reinstated the death penalty in 1973,
sixteen prisoners have left the state's death row, of which six were executed and ten (63%) had their
convictions or sentences overturned); Duncan Mansfield, The Price ofDeath Penalty? Maybe Millions,
A.P. NEWSWIRES, Mar. 26, 2000, available in Westlaw, News Library, APWIRES file ("Tennessee,
with 97 people on Death Row" who have accumulated over the past 22 years since the first post-
Furman death sentence was imposed in April 1978, see Houston v. State, 593 SW2d 267 (Tenn. 1980),
"is [still awaiting] its first execution since 1960."); Howard Mintz, Slow Death: The Capital
Punishment Gridlock in California, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 12, 2000, at Al, available in
Westlaw, News Library, SJMERCURY file (reporting that between 1992 and 2000, California's death
row grew from 350 to over 550 inmates, but it only executed seven men; in approximately the same
period, state courts overturned approximately 10 death sentences, and federal courts overturned at least
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It is sometimes suggested that Illinois, whose governor declared a
moratorium on executions in January 2000 because of the spate of
death row exonerations there,' generates less reliable death sen-
tences than other states.4' Our data do not support this hypothesis:
The overall rate of error found to infect Illinois capital sentences
(66%) is slightly lower than the rate in capital-sentencing states as a
whole (68%).46
* High error rates have persisted for decades. More than 50% of all
cases reviewed were found seriously flawed in 20 of the 23 study
years, including in 17 of the last 19 years. In half of the years
studied, the error rate was over 60%. Although error rates detected
on state direct appeal and federal habeas corpus dropped modestly in
the early 1990s, they went back up in 1995. 47 The amount of error
detected on state post-conviction has risen sharply throughout the
1990s.,
" The 68% rate of capital error found by the three stage inspection
process is much higher than the < 15 % rate of error those same three
inspections evidently discover in noncapital criminal cases.49
13); Rene Stutzman, High Court Puts Death Cases Back into Play: Errors Were Found in 10 of 12
Capital-Punishment Cases Reviewed This Year, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 24, 1999, at D1, available
in 1999 WL 2829798 (stating that in the first eight months of 1999, the Florida Supreme Court found
trial errors requiring retrial, resentencing, or conversion of the sentence to life in prison in 83 % of the
first-time death penalty appeals it reviewed; the figure for all of 1998 was 77%); Sean Whaley,
Nevada's Death Row History Criticized, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Feb. 7, 2000, at 1B, available in
Westlaw, News Library, LV-RJ-C file (reporting that since 1993 state and federal courts have reversed
the convictions of eight of the state's death row inmates, including three (as of this writing, four, see
Brendan Riley, Emotional Mazzan Released, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., May 7, 2000, at 1) who were
released from prison; and that since 1979 eight men have been executed in Nevada, but that all but one
of them gave up their appeals and volunteered to be executed).
44. See supra note 8.
45. See, e.g., Governor Says He Will Not Impose Moratorium on Executions, A.P. NEwSWIREs,
Feb. 15,2000 available in Westlaw, News Library, APWIRBS file (quoting Florida Governor Jeb Bush
as stating, "Illinois appears to have a unique problem with the administration of capital punishment.
Here in Florida, there is no competent evidence that suggests an innocent person has been wrongly
executed.").
46. See DADB, supra note 23; HADB, supra note 23; A Broken System, supra note 23. See also
National Composite and Illinois Report Cards, A Broken System, supra note 23; Figure 2, infra (all
offering state comparisons).
47. See infra Figure 2.
48. Id.
49. Data on direct appeal and post-conviction outcomes in noncapital cases is sketchy, but suggests
the following conclusions: (1) At the direct appeal stage, serious or reversible error is detected in about
12 to 20% of appealed noncapital criminal judgments. (2) Noncapital criminal judgments that are
appealed compose only a small subset of the criminal convictions that are obtained. The vast majority
of criminal convictions result from bargained guilty pleas, and most pleas are not appealed. (By
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* Appointed federal judges are sometimes thought to be more likely to
overturn capital sentences than elected state judges.'0 In fact, state
judges are the first and most important line of defense against
erroneous death sentences. Elected state judges found serious error
in and reversed 90% (2,133 of 2,370) of the capital sentences that
were overturned during the study period."'
" Under current state and federal law, capital prisoners have a legal
right to one round of direct appellate, state post-conviction, and
federal habeas corpus review.' The high rates of error found at
contrast, virtually every capital conviction and sentence is appealed. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 174-75 & n.1 (1990).) (3) The best available evidence is that serious error is detected in
about 3 % of the noncapital federal habeas corpus petitions that are filed, and that such petitions are
filed by about three or four out of every 1000 state prisoners each year. (4) Although there is no
similar data for noncapital state post-conviction proceedings, most criminal lawyers believe noncapital
error is detected less often there than on federal habeas corpus, and that prisoners are no more likely
to seek state post-conviction than federal habeas corpus review. These conclusions are based on
evidence presented in James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2000); Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 So. CAL.
L. REV. 2057, 2524 (1993) (estimating "that of every thousand persons convicted in state prosecutions
and committed to custody in any given year, only three to four actually file habeas corpus petitions
challenging their custody"); Brief Amicus Curiae of Benjamin Civiletti, et al., in Support of Respondent
Frank R. West in Wright v. West, No. 91-542, 505 U.S. 277 (1992) (filed Mar. 4, 1992) App. A,
Table I, n.1 (providing data on the rate of relief granted to state prisoners from 1963-1981).
Assume, very conservatively, that (1) 70% of all criminal judgments are reviewed on direct
appeal, among which 20% (14% of the original pool) are found to contain serious error; (2) 10% of
the cases that were affirmed on direct appeal (i.e., 6% of the original pool) go on to state post-
conviction review, atwhich stage 5% (.3% of the original pool) are found to contain serious error; and
(3) 10% of the cases that were affirmed on direct appeal and were not overturned on state post-
conviction (another 6 % of the original pool) go on to federal habeas review, at which stage another 5 %
(.3% of the original pool) are found to contain serious error. Even vastly overestimating both the
appeal and reversal rates in this way generates only a 15% (14% + .3% + .3% = 14.6%) overall
error rate.
50. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S3362 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("[O]ne
of the biggest [federal habeas corpus] problems [is] looney judges in the Federal courts who basically
will grant a habeas corpus petition for any reason at all.").
51. See DADB, supra note 23; HCDB, supra note 23; A Broken System, supra note 23. See also
National Composite Report Card, A Broken System, supra note 23. Because some post-conviction
reversals are unknown, see supra note 36 and A Broken System, supra note 23, while all federal court
reversals are known, the ratio of state to federal reversals is actually higher. On the other hand, we
count a handful of United States Supreme Court reversals on certiorari following direct appeal and state
post-conviction as, respectively, direct appeal and state post-conviction findings of error. See supra
note 36.
52. See Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1605 (2000) (explaining the relationship between the
exhaustion of state remedies and the availability of habeas review); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct.
1495, 1500-03 (2000) (recounting the prisoner's journey through the state direct appeal, state post-
conviction, and federal habeas corpus systems); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644
(1998) ("It has been settled since Er parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), that a state prisoner must
normally exhaust available state judicial remedies before a federal court will entertain his petition for
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each stage, and at the last stage, and the persistence of high error
rates over time and across the nation, confirm the need for multiple
judicial inspections. Without compensating changes at the front-end
of the process, the contrary policy of cutting back on judicial
inspection would seem to make no more sense than responding to the
impending insolvency of the Social Security System by forbidding it
to be audited.
0 Finding this much error takes time. Calculating the amount of time
using information in published decisions is difficult. Only a small
percentage of direct appeals decisions report the sentence date. By the
end of the habeas stage, however, a much larger proportion of sen-
tencing dates is reported in some decision in the case. It accordingly
is possible to get an accurate sense of timing for the 599 cases that
were finally reviewed on habeas corpus. Among those cases:
1. It took an average of 7.6 years after the defendant was sentenced
to die to complete federal habeas corpus consideration in the 40 %
of habeas cases in which reversible error was found.
2. In the cases in which no error was detected at the third inspection
stage and an execution occurred, the average time between sen-
tence and execution was nine years.53
As Figure 2 reveals, high rates of error frustrate the goals of the death
penalty system. Figure 2 compares the overall rates of error detected
during the state direct appeal and federal inspection process in the 28 states
with at least one capital judgment that has completed that process, to the
percentage of death sentences imposed by each state that it has carried out
by execution. In general, where the overall error rate reaches 55% or
above (as is true for the vast majority of the states), the percentage of death
sentences carried out drops below 7%.
habeas corpus." (quoting Picard v. Connor, 4040 U.S. 270, 275 (1971))).
53. See HCDB, supra note 23; A Broken System, supra note 23. A Justice Department study
concludes that the time from death sentence to execution has increased over time to about 11 years for
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Figure 2 illustrates another finding of interest: The pattern of capital
outcomes for the State of Virginia is clearly an outlier-the State's high
execution rate is nearly double that of the next nearest state and five times
the national average, and its low rate of capital reversals is nearly half that
of the next nearest state and less than one-fourth the national average. A
sharp discrepancy between Virginia and other capital-sentencing juris-
dictions characterizes most of our analyses. 4 That discrepancy presents
an important question for further study: Are Virginia capital judgments in
fact half as prone to serious error as the next lowest state and four times
less than the national average?55 Or, on the other hand, are its courts
more tolerant of serious error?56 Or, have Virginia's legislature and
courts censored opportunities to inspect verdicts and detect error by
procedurally constraining the definition of error and the time within which
errors can be identified?57 We will address this issue below and in a
subsequent report.
The rising number of executions nationally58 does not render these
54. See Figure 3, infra; A Broken System, supra note 23.
55. For this view, see Brooke A. Masters, A Rush on Va. 's Death Row, WASH. POsr, Apr. 28,
2000, at Al, available in 2000 WL 19606141, presenting the arguments of Virginia officials who
attribute the discrepancy to prosecutorial restraint and narrow sentencing statutes.
56. For a report taking this position, see American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Unequal,
Unfair and Irreversible: The Death Penalty in Virginia 5 (Apr. 2000) (visited Apr. 28, 2000)
<http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/nO407OOa.htnl> [hereinafter Unequal, Unfair, and Irreversible].
57. In considering whether Virginia capital judgments are substantially less error prone than all
others in the nation or, on the other hand, whether laxer error detection takes place there, the death-
sentencing states that surround Virginia and lie within its same federal judicial circuit-Maryland, North
Carolina, and South Carolina-may be treated as "natural controls." Insofar as philosophical, cultural,
or historical factors-which probably do not vary much between Virginia and its neighbors-are thought
to be the main influences on the amount of expected error in capital judgments, the fact that high capital
error rates are consistently found in states bordering Virginia casts doubt on the hypothesis that Virginia
capital sentences are starkly less error-prone. For this analysis to show convincingly that Virginia
courts are laxer detectors of serious capital error than courts in the surrounding states, however, there
would have to be an explanation for that difference among presumably similar states.
The explanation may lie in the unusual extent to which Virginia courts limit review of capital
judgments by, for example: (1) enforcing the region's (and nation's) strictest procedural default doctrine
(the rule permitting even egregious error to be ignored on appeal if it was not objected to at trial); (2)
often appointing substandard trial attorneys to represent the indigents who make up 97% of the state's
death row, thus increasing the probability that necessary objections will not be made at trial, and thus
that appellate review will be cut off; (3) applying an overly strict test for reversing capital judgments
based on incompetent lawyering (until the Supreme Court overturned Virginia's test earlier this year,
see Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000)); (4) limiting defendants' ability to petition for a new
trial based on innocence to a 21-day period following conviction, the shortest such time frame in the
region (and nation); and (5) failing throughout most of the study period to provide lawyers or to fund
them at the state post-conviction stage, further undermining the quality of error detection at that stage.
See Masters, supra note 55; Unequal, Unfair, and Irreversible, supra note 56, at 11-37, 53 & n.7 1.
58. Between 1984 and 1991, there were an average of 15 nonconsensual executions each year.
That number rose to 27 between 1992 and 1994, to 53 in the succeeding four-year period and then to
88 in 1999. See DEATH ROW U.S.A., supra note 2, at 1465. For our reasons for focusing on
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patterns obsolete. Instead of indicating improvement in the quality of death
sentences under review, the rising number of executions may simply reflect
how many more sentences have piled up awaiting review. If the error-
induced pile-up of cases on death row is the cause of rising executions,
their rise provides no proof that a cure has been found for disturbingly
high and persistent error rates. The rising execution rate and the persistent
error rate increase the likelihood of an increase in the incidence of
wrongful executions. 9 To see why this is true, consider a factory that
produced 100 toasters in a year, only 32 of which worked. The factory's
production problem would not be deemed fixed if the company simply
raised its production run to 200 the next year in order to double the
number of working toasters to 66. Thus, the real question isn't the number
of death sentences carried out each year, but the proportion.
Figure 31 below shows that in contrast to the annual number of
executions (the middle line in the chart), the proportion of death row
inmates executed each year (the bottom line in the chart) has remained
remarkably stable- and extremely low. Since post-Furman executions
began in earnest in 1984, the nation has executed only an average of about
1.3 % of its death row inmates each year; in no year has it carried out more
than 2.6%-or one in thirty-nine-of death sentences exposed to full
review.
Figure 3 suggests that the rising number of executions (the middle
line) is not caused by any improvement in the quality of capital judgments,
but instead by the inexorable pile-up of people on death row (the top line
in the chart) as judges struggle to exercise a degree of quality control over
decade upon decade of error-prone capital judgments.
nonconsensual executions, see supra note 27.
59. See infra note 78.
60. For the data in Figure 3 in tabular form, see A Broken System, supra note 23.
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111. Confirmation from a Parallel Study
Results from a parallel study by the U.S. Department of Justice
suggest that our 32 % figure for valid death sentences actually overstates the
chance of execution. The 1998 Justice Department study includes a report
showing the outcome of the 263 death sentences imposed in 1989.61 A
final disposition of only 103 of the 263 death sentences had been reached
nine years later.62 Of those 103, 78 (76%) had been overturned by a state
or federal court. Only thirteen death sentences had been carried out.6'
So, for every one member of the death row class of 1989 whose case was
finally reviewed and who was executed as of 1998, six members of the
class had their cases overturned in the courts. Because of the intensive
review needed to catch so much error, 160 (61 %) of the 263 death sen-
tences imposed in 1989 were still under scrutiny nine years later.'
The approximately 3500 people on death row today have been waiting
an average of 7.4 years for a final declaration that their capital verdict is
error-free-or, far more probably, that it is the product of serious error.'
Of the 6700 people sentenced to die between 1973 and 1999, only 598-
less than one in eleven-were executed.' About three times as many had
their capital judgments overturned or gained clemency.67
IV. Implications of Central Findings
To help appreciate these findings, consider a scenario that might
unfold any of the nearly 300 times a year that a death sentence is imposed
in the United States. Suppose the defendant, or a relative of the victim,
asks a lawyer or the judge, "What now?" Based on almost a quarter cen-
tury of experience in thousands of cases in 28 death-sentencing states in the
United States between 1973 and 1995, a responsible answer would be:
61. For this purpose, 1989 was an average year. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIcs, supra note
27, at 13, app. tbl. 1.
62. See id. (listing the number of prisoners removed from their sentence by execution, death from
other causes, overturning of their sentence or conviction, or commuting of their sentence).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 1, 14 app. tbl. 2 (totalling 3,452 prisoners in 38 states as of Dec. 31, 1998); DEATH
ROW U.S.A., supra note 2, at 1457.
66. DEATH Row U.S.A., supra note 2, at 1457. We estimated 6,700 death sentences by
extrapolating from the growth rate from 1997 to 1998. Using the December 31, 1998 figure of 6,432,
see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 27, at 16, we estimated that an additional 270 persons
were sentenced to death during 1999. Returning to our 1989 example, the 13 executions by 1998 of
individuals sentenced to die in 1989 represent only one in twenty of the 263 people condemned in 1989.
See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
67. DEATH Row U.S.A., supra note 2, at 1457.
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"The capital conviction or sentence will probably be overturned due to
serious error.68 It'll take about nine years to find out,69 given how many
other capital cases being reviewed for likely error are lined up ahead of
this one. If the judgment is overturned, a lesser conviction or sentence will
probably be imposed." 7
As any person hearing this statement would likely conclude as a matter
of common sense, these reversals due to serious error, and the time it takes
to expose them, are costly. Capital trials and sentences cost more than
noncapital ones. 71 Each time they have to be done over-as happens 68%
68. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (reporting an error rate of68%). In a recent study,
the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) reported that 35.3 % of the persons sentenced to death in this
country have had their capital judgements overturned. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note
27, at 15 app. tbl. 3. Two factors explain the difference between the BJS figure and the 68 % error rate
calculated here and in A Broken System:
(1) The BJS figure is calculated by taking all persons removed from death sentence as of
December 31, 1998, as a proportion of all death sentences imposed through that date. This means that
prisoners sentenced to death whose cases had not made it through all (or any) stages of appeal are still
included in the denominator in the BJS study. Both the BJS study and A Broken System suggest that
about five years elapse between sentence and thefirst direct appeal. Because these pending cases also
take an average of over nine years to receivefull review including the maximum three inspections (and
nearly 11 years for death sentences imposed after 1988), there were literally thousands of prisoners on
death row in 1998 for whom no final judicial action had been taken. These cases are excluded from
the denominator in this report and in A Broken System, but appear in the denominator in the BJS report.
Put another way, the BJS figure is simply an inventory of death row inmates, which reports the
proportion of persons sentenced to die-regardIless of whether their death sentences have been fully
reviewed by the courts-whose death sentences have been judicially overturned as of that moment. In
contrast, the figure reported here is the error rate, which reveals the proportion of capital judgements
that werefinally reviewed by the courts that were overturned at one or another of the three inspection
stages due to serious error.
(2) The BJS error rate is computed on the basis of individual men and women, not judgments.
In the BJS study, therefore, if individual's death sentence is overturned and that individual is then re-
sentenced to death, this reversal is not counted in the BJS figure, even though there was error in the
original sentence. Many individuals' death sentences are overturned multiple times-some as many as
four-and the BJS inventory of prisoners, as opposed to death sentences, misses these reversals.
69. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (calculating a nine-year average time lapse between
sentencing and execution); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 27, at 12 thl. 12.
70. See supra note 42.
71. The trial, incarceration, and execution of sentence in capital cases cost from $2.5 to $5 million
dollars per inmate (in current dollars), compared to less than $1 million for each killer sentenced to life
without parole. See, e.g., Margot Garey, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of the Death
Penalty, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1221, 1268-70 (1985) (estimating the cost of trying a capital case at
$600,000 and the annual cost of housing a prisoner on death row at $15,000); Samuel R. Gross, The
Romance of Revenge: Capital Punishment in America, 13 STUD. IN L., POL. & SOC'Y 71, 78 (1993)
(reporting a $3.2 million cost per execution in Florida, and Kansas's rejection of the death penalty
because of the cost); Paul W. Keve, The Costliest Punishment-A Corrections Administrator
Contemplates the Death Penalty, FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1992, at 11, 12-13 (collecting estimates of
the cost of an execution from several states); Aaron Chambers, Resources a Concern in Death Penalty
Reform, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 24, 1999, at 19, available in Westlaw, News Library, CHIDLB
file (giving an estimate of $5.2 million from pretrial to execution); Duncan Mansfield, The Price of
Death Penalty? Maybe Millions, A.P. NEWSWIRES, Mar. 26, 2000, available in Westlaw, News
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of the time-some or all of that difference is doubled. The error-detection
system all this capital error requires is itself a huge expense-evidently
millions of dollars per case.'
When retrial demonstrates that nearly four-fifths of the capital
judgments in which serious error is found are more appropriately handled
as non-capital cases (and in a sizeable number of instances, as non-murder
or even non-criminal cases),' it is hard to escape the conclusion that most
of the resources the capital system currently consumes are not buying the
public, or victims,74 the valid death sentences for egregious offenses that
a maj-ority support. Rather, those resources are being wasted on the trial
and review of cases that for the most part are not capital and are seriously
flawed.
Public faith in the courts and the criminal justice system is another
casualty of high capital error rates.' When the vast majority of capital
sentencing jurisdictions carry out fewer than 6% of the death sentences
Library, APWIRES file (quoting a Tennessee lawyer's estimate of a $1 to $2 million cost per
execution); David Noonan, Death Row Cost is a Killer, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Oct. 17, 1999, at 27,
available in 1999 WL 23488045 (reporting the cost of prosecuting and defending New York capital
cases from 1994 to 1999, a period during which only five capital sentences were imposed and none
carried out, as $68 million); A. Wallace Tashima, A Costly Ultimate Sanction, THE Los ANGELES
DAILY J., June 20, 1991, at 6 (writing that the cost of an execution to California taxpayers is $4 to $5
million).
72. When post-trial review costs are factored in, the cost comparison between capital and
noncapital cases is something like $24 million dollars per executed prisoner, compared to $1 million
for each inmate serving a life sentence without parole. See S.V. Date, The High Price of Killing
Killers, PALM BEAcH POST, Jan. 4, 2000, at 1A, available in 2000 WL 7592885. See also Ken
Armstrong & Steve Mills, Inept Defenses Cloud Verdicts, With Their Lives at Stake, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
15, 1999, at NI, available in 1999 WL 2932352 ("In Illinois, the resources rallied on appeal often
dwarf those summoned to keep a defendant off Death Row in the first place"); Armstrong & Mills,
Justice Derailed, supra note 29, at NI (discussing the "staggering" costs of capital case reversals and
exonerations in Illinois). As Armstrong and Mills note:
"Taxpayers have not only had to finance multimillion-dollar settlements to wrongly
convicted Death Row inmates-[Dennis] Williams alone received $13 million from Cook
County-but also have had to pay for new trials, sentencing hearings and appeals in more
than 100 cases where a condemned inmate's original trial was undermined by some
fundamental error.").
Id.
73. See supra note 42.
74. Cf. Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, The Flip Side of a Fair Trial: Trial and Error-How
Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, at N1, available in 1999 WL 2873462
(studying the effects of prosecutorial misconduct in Illinois homicide and capital cases, and concluding
that "the reversals exact a toll on victims and their families who are forced to come back to court,
reopening sometimes barely healed emotional wounds").
75. For an example, see Armstrong & Mills, Justice Derailed, supra note 29:
Capital punishment in Illinois is a system so riddled with faulty evidence, unscrupulous
trial tactics and legal incompetence that justice has been forsaken, a Tribune investigation
has found....
The findings reveal a system so plagued by unprofessionalism, imprecision and bias that
they have rendered the state's ultimate form of punishment its least credible.
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they impose,76 and when the nation as a whole never executes more than
3% of its death population in a year,77 the retributive and deterrent
credibility of the death penalty is low.
When condemned inmates turn out to be innocent,7" the error is
different in its consequences, but not evidently different in its causes, from
the other serious error discussed here.79  There is no accounting for this
cost: to the wrongly convicted;' ° to the family of the victim, whose search
for justice and closure has been in vain; to later victims whose lives are
threatened-and even taken-because the real killers remain at large; '
and to the wrongly executed, should justice miscarry at trial, and should
reviewing judges, harried by the amount of capital error they are asked to
catch, miss one.'
76. See Figure 2, supra.
77. See Figure 3, supra.
78. See Dan Rather, Dead Wrong, CBS 60 Minutes II, Apr. 12, 2000 <http://cbsnews.cbs.com/
now/story/0,1597,182812-412.shtml > (visited May 17, 2000) (contending there is strong evidence that
Jerry Lee Hogue, whom Texas executed in 1998, was innocent). Between 1972 and the beginning of
1998, 68 people were released from death row because faulty convictions were overturned and too little
evidence remained to retry the prisoner. See Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in
Capital Cases, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1998, at 125, 130-32 (1998); Michael L. Radelet
et al., Prisoners Released from Death Rows Since 1970 Because of Doubts About Their Guilt, 13 T.M.
COOLEY L. REv. 907, 916 (1996). As of this writing (June 2000), the number of inmates released
from death row as factually or legally innocent apparently has risen to 87. Nine were released in 1999
alone. See Frank Green, Question of Life or Death: Illinois Exonerations Spark Capital Punishment
Debate, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 2, 2000, at Al, available in 2000 WL 503442.
79. Compare SCHECK, NEUFELD & DWYER, supra note 17, at 172-92 (attributing the conviction
of the innocent in large part to incompetent lawyers and prosecutorial suppression of evidence, the two
most common errors detected in the reversals discussed in this study).
80. Cf. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Flawed Murder Cases Prompt Calls for Probe, CHi. TRIB.,
Jan. 24, 2000, at NI, available in 2000 WL 3629579 (reporting that $36 million was paid to settle
lawsuits by four men who were wrongly convicted, two of murder and two of capital murder); Laurie
Goering, Florida Lets Speed Govern Executions, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 2000, at NI, available in 2000
WL 3640614 (noting that Florida paid $1 million in damages for falsely incarcerating two inmates on
death row for 12 years); Paul W. Valentine, Md. to Give Cleared Man $300,000, WASH. PosT, June
23, 1994, at B1, available in 1994 WL 2426459 (reporting that Kirk Bloodworth was given $300,000
compensation for the nine years he served for a wrongful rape and murder conviction).
81. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 1999, at Ni, available in 1999 WL 2834238 (detailing how twelve years after the
"Ford Heights 4" were falsely convicted in Chicago of two rape-murders, and five years before the
four were exonerated following several judicial reversals, one of the actual perpetrators still at large
suffocated a third woman to death in a vacant apartment near the scene of the earlier crimes); Brooke
A. Masters, Lucky Release From a Life Behind Bars, WAsH. POsr, April 28, 2000, at A23, available
in 2000 WL 19606130 (discussing David Vasquez's incarceration in Virginia for a capital murder he
did not commit, and the murder spree on which the real killer embarked in the meantime).
82. See supra note 17 (discussing George Will's conviction that innocent men and women have
been executed); supra note 29 (discussing how close the Illinois Supreme Court came to missing the
miscarriage of justice in Anthony Porter's case). All of the points made in this section are made much
more poignantly in a recent article in the Seattle Times about Seattle murder victim Esther Vinikow.
After prosecutors said they would consider the views of the victims' family before deciding whether
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If the issue was the fabrication of toasters (to return to our prior
example), or the licensing of automobile drivers, or the conduct of any
other private- or public-sector activity, neither the consuming public nor
managers and investors would tolerate the error rates and attendant costs
that dozens of states and the nation as a whole have tolerated in their
capital punishment systems over the course of decades. Any system with
this much error and expense would be halted immediately, examined, and
either reformed or scrapped. We ask taxpayers, public managers, and
policymakers whether that same response is warranted here, when the issue
is not the content and quality of tomorrow's breakfast but whether society
has a swift and sure response to murder and whether thousands of men and
women condemned for that crime in fact deserve to die.
to seek the death penalty against the alleged killer, Robert Wentz, a reporter interviewed Ms. Vinikow's
children:
Like most Americans, Esther Vinikow's children support the death penalty. But they say
Wentz, if found guilty, should not be executed. Not because whoever killed her doesn't deserve
it, but because it takes too long and costs too much.
To Jerome Vinikow, 58, Esther Vinikow's only son, the death penalty seems to only
protract the tragedy .... "As long as he's away permanently, I'm not sure.. ." he trails off.
"If he does get the death penalty, and it's 10 to 12 years of waiting, I don't know what good that
does."
In many ways, the family's misgivings reflect a growing national impatience and unease
about capital punishment. In the aftermath of a tragedy, they have become drawn into a
discussion that provides no easy answers.
Superior Court trials cost taxpayers an average of $388,680. State and federal appeals
of death-penalty cases take an average of 11 years, according to a recent study by state Supreme
Court Justice Richard Guy. That's eroded public confidence in the justice system, Guy said.
But polls also suggest growing unease about capital punishment, particularly after several
death-row inmates in Illinois were released when new evidence proved their innocence.
The decades it takes to execute an inmate may have saved lives, notes Jerome Vinikow
of Bellevue. That possibility should not be lost in the rush forjustice. "I'm not against the death
penalty. I used to wonder why it took 10 or 12 years, but it's obvious when you see all the
mistakes in Illinois, you have to be careful," he said.
At first, [the victim's daughter, Dolores] Beck-Schwartz, 62, of Pumam Valley, N.Y.,
wanted whomever a jury convicted to be put to death. It seemed an appropriate punishment for
someone who took the life of such a defenseless, gentle person, she said.
But Beck-Schwartz had second thoughts when she considered the years that pass between
trial and execution-if the sentence isn't overturned along the way. "If it happened within a
year, I'm fine with that. But if it dragged on year after year, it won't make it any easier," she
said. "It won't bring her back. It won't make me feel better."
Alex Fryer, Victim's Family Wrestles Death-Penalty Issue, SEATTLE TIMES, May 14, 2000, at B3,
available in 2000 WL 5535689.
